Jewish Synagogue Rulers. Nanos has forged a fascinating if fragile thesis about the identity of the ruling authorities in Romans 13:1-7. In The Mystery of Romans (1996), Nanos argues that at the time of the writing of Paul’s letter, the Christ-movement (Jew and Gentile) in Rome was still intimately related to the Judean synagogues in that city. Nanos’s thesis that the “weaker brother” of Romans 14 was the non-Christian Jew has provided much fodder for discussion among Pauline scholars. Less influential has been his reading of Romans 13:1-7 in light of his overarching thesis. Nanos argues (289-336) that the “governing authorities” of Romans 13 are the Jewish synagogue rulers. He contends that Paul was “not concerned with the state, empire, or any other such organization of secular government. His concern was rather to address the obligation of Christians, particularly Christian gentiles associating with the synagogues of Rome for the practice of their new ‘faith,’ to subordinate themselves to the leaders of the synagogues and to the customary ‘rules of behavior’ that had been developed in Diaspora synagogues for defining the appropriate behavior of ‘righteous gentiles’ seeking association with Jews and their God” (291).

Nanos finds a correspondence between the four terms Paul uses for those with authority and four tiers or functions of authority within the Jewish synagogue. The four terms are: (1) exousiais hyperechousais, governing authorities, (2) archontes, rulers, (3) theou diakonos, minister of God, and (4) leitourgoi theou, servants of God. Nanos argues that all of these terms make sense when applied to the context of the Jewish synagogue. He is able to provide some textual support for this application of the terms, mostly from Luke (301-05). Nanos argues that the latter two terms (ministers of God and servants of God) have very specific referents within the synagogue. According to Nanos, “ministers of God” is a reference to those who have been commissioned by the synagogue to discipline or punish morally deviant members of the Jewish community (306), while “servants of God” refers to those charged with collecting the annual Temple Tax. Nanos adds some credibility to this thesis with this chiastic inversion (320):

[A] Authority #1: exousiais hyperechousais (higher authorities)
[B] Authority #2: archontes (rulers)
[C] Authority #3: diakonos (ministers)
[D] Authority #4: leitourgoi (servants)
[D’] Payment due to authority #4 (leitourgoi): phoron (tax)
[C’] Payment due to authority #3 (diakonos): telos (custom)
[B’] Payment due to authority #2 (archontes): phobon (fear)
[A’] Payment due to authority #1 (exousiais hyperechousais): timen (honor)[1]

Although telos (custom) is taken by most scholars to refer to a custom tax, Nanos argues that here it refers to social “obligations” or the “fulfillment” of responsibilities. Thus Paul’s mandate to give telos to whom telos is due would refer to “‘the fulfilling of good results to those concerned with the results of your righteous behavior,’ in the context of fulfilling the halakhot applicable to the ‘righteous gentile’ associating with the synagogue.” Whereas in the traditional reading, Nanos argues, telos (custom tax) and phoron (tax) are redundant, on his reading the reference is to “taxes as well as ethical behavior” (317).

For Nanos, this reading of 13:1-7 is a kind of double-edged sword. First, it resolves the problem many scholars (e.g. Käsemann 1980: 352; Kallas 1964; Munro 1983: 16-19; O’Neill 1975: 207-9; Minear 1971: 88) have characterized as an abrupt transition (or lack thereof) to church-state relations in 13:1-7 from Jewish-Gentile relations in chs. 9-11, local community relations in ch. 12, and back again in ch. 14ff, by bringing “the smaller paraenesis of 13:1-7 into harmony with the several parallel tensions that exist between: Christian gentiles and non-Christian Jews” in chs. 9-11, “Christians and their ‘brethren’” (Jews), in chs. 12 and 14, “Christians and their ‘neighbors’” (Jews), in chs. 12-15, “Christians and their ‘enemies,’” (Jews), in the latter part of ch. 12, and the “strong” (Christians) and the “weak” (non-Christian Jews) of ch. 14 (1996: 322).

Second, Nanos’s reading solves the problem of having to reconcile such a glowing appraisal of the Roman empire with Paul’s other very critical comments about the empire (e.g. 1 Thess. 5:2-8; 1 Cor. 2:6-8; 6:1) and with the broad antagonism that existed toward Rome, even in Rome, within Second Temple Judaism (cf. Borg 1972: 208-11). Nanos reminds us that

the traditional interpretations have not successfully accounted for the fact that this letter was addressed to Rome during the reign of Nero by a Jewish man whose worldview was thoroughly informed by the prophetic writings[2] and who had, along with his whole generation, seen the continual destruction of their people and interests under the tyrannical reigns of Herod and the Roman rulers. . . . It is in this context that the wealth of apocalyptic literature of this period was born with many veiled references to Rome as “Babylon.” These are simply not times in which the posture toward Roman authority was unequivocally positive, to say the least. (290 n.3)

If Nanos’s reading of Romans 13 is correct, this universally acknowledged conundrum simply disappears. In light of such a miracle, the fact that Nanos’s reading of Romans 13 has received little serious attention is somewhat surprising, yet rather revealing, because while Nanos’s account provides some compelling exegesis for his thesis, it also suffers from some insoluble problems.

While Nanos is able to find some uses of exousiai and of archontes in reference to synagogue authorities, he is not able to produce such a reference for the complete term Paul uses, exousiais hyperechousais. Moreover, he is forced to argue that the terms diakonos and leitourgoi could apply to agents of the synagogue, because he is not able to produce textual evidence for such a use. This reading is further vitiated by the fact, as Strobel (1956) has shown, that these terms both had normal referents in the secular vernacular; specifically, they referred to junior authorized officials in the government service. While Nanos acknowledges this, he does not think Paul would have called Roman officials servants or ministers of God (306).[3] And of course, his argument that telos in 13:7 refers to ethical conduct is tenuous at best, especially since phoron and telos were the normal terms for the direct and indirect taxes. Their coupling here is hardly redundant, as Nanos claims it is, in light of the widespread protests against the indirect taxes that were taking place around the time of the writing of the letter (see below).

A more significant problem for Nanos is what to do with the “sword” (machaira) in 13:4. Synagogue authorities did not routinely use the sword in disciplinary matters. Nanos is thus forced to argue that the reference to the sword in 13:4 is a metaphor for the Torah, the Word of God, as mediated by the synagogue authorities who were its proper interpreters. The “sword” then represents the synagogue authorities’ power to “judge behavior (and faith claims) based on their interpretation of Torah” (312). In fact, Nanos points out, Paul himself had been “engaged in such disciplinary functions under the ‘authority’ of the synagogue in his former manner of life against ‘the Way’” (311).[4] Nanos anticipates his critics when he acknowledges that, on the surface at least, a metaphorical/figurative reading of the “sword” might appear strained. In response, Nanos points our attention to 13:12, only eight verses later, where Paul uses the image of the “armor of light.” “Certainly,” Nanos protests, “no one would argue that Paul intended for his audience literally to ‘put on armor,’ or even metaphorically in that they should adopt the moral behavior of a soldier. That would defy the plain sense of the text” (312-13).[5] Despite this attempt at a defense, defying the plain sense of the text is just what Nanos has done in his treatment of the sword in 13:4.

Thus, Esler counters, Paul’s audience “would more naturally have understood it as a reference to Roman power. The ‘sword’ had a literal significance, referring to the power vested in Roman provincial governors to execute Roman citizens by the sword (the ius gladii), but it could also thus have a figurative reference to the power of Roman officials vested with imperium to execute those who fell foul of them, whatever the means of death chosen” (2003: 332). Indeed, Nanos himself acknowledges that the sword was a figurative symbol of Roman power (1996: 310, 313-14), but he does not acknowledge that this poses a problem for his thesis. Esler sums it up well when he writes that the image of the sword seems “too draconian an image for the much lower levels of discipline allowed to synagogue authorities” (2003: 332).

Labels: New Perspective on Paul, Paul, Pauline Theology, Romans 13